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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) will 
soon become another instrument used to regulate the use of armed force.  
In 2010, the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute is expected 
to adopt a definition of the crime of aggression.1  Armed conflict in the 
post-U.N. Charter era, however, is not easily defined or regulated under 
the existing legal regime.  Aggression has been defined in terms of viola-
tions of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, when a State uses force that 
violates another State’s territorial integrity or political independence.  
While traditional wars between two sovereign States are limited by the 
U.N. Charter and customary international law, uncertainty surrounds the 
legal nature of humanitarian intervention, preemptive self-defense, and 
actions against non-State actors.  When, if ever, do these contemporary 
applications of military force cross the threshold of unlawful aggression? 
Consider, for example, the legality of the 1999-armed intervention 
in Kosovo by NATO forces.  Many argue that, although not technically 
lawful under the U.N. Charter, it was morally defensible for the humani-
tarian purpose of protecting the Kosovo Albanian population from 
slaughter.  The legality of actions to combat terrorism is also worth con-
sidering in the post-9/11 era.  When U.S.-led forces toppled Saddam 
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 1. Article 123 of the Rome Statute provides that a Review Conference is to take place seven 
years after the Statute entered into force, which happened in July 2002.  Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court art. 123, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1068 [hereinafter Rome Statute].  See 
also Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Review Conference of the Rome Statute, 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=review (last visited July 30, 2009). 
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Hussein’s Iraq in 2003 under the guise of preemptive self-defense, osten-
sibly to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to Saddam’s mythic 
weapons of mass destruction, many in the international community cried 
foul.  Similarly, U.S. drone attacks on suspected Taliban strongholds in 
Pakistan in 2008 and 2009 were based on self-defense, a principle typi-
cally reserved for responding to attacks by a State, not non-State armed 
groups. 
The changing nature of armed conflict—from the traditional war 
between two States to the modern humanitarian intervention or action 
against non-State armed groups—requires a two-step analysis to deter-
mine whether the threshold of unlawful aggression has been crossed.  
The first step is determining whether the use of force violates the U.N. 
Charter.  If the answer is yes, then the analysis shifts to whether the un-
lawful use of force is a manifest violation of the Charter.  Only after re-
solving these questions can individuals be held responsible before the 
ICC for the crime of aggression. 
This article examines the draft definition of the crime of aggression 
and how this definition will be applied to certain uses of armed force, 
ultimately identifying whether these actions constitute “manifest viola-
tions” of the U.N. Charter.  Part II establishes the analytical framework 
of criminal aggression.  Initially, the threshold question is explained in 
detail, followed by an examination of the Charter’s prohibition of the 
unlawful use of force and the magnitude test required to determine mani-
fest violations of the Charter.  The threshold question is then applied to 
humanitarian intervention in Part III.  In Part IV, certain measures 
against terrorism, preemptive self-defense, and attacks against non-State 
armed groups, are examined under the terms of the draft definition of 
aggression.  Ultimately, whether cases of criminal aggression go forward 
at the ICC will be an issue of intent, as addressed in Part V.  The article 
concludes in Part VI with a brief summary of issues that will hopefully 
be resolved by an operational definition of the crime of aggression. 
It would be unrealistic to attempt to enumerate every possible mani-
fest violation of the U.N. Charter for the purposes of criminal aggression.  
Thus, this article establishes a preliminary framework for analyzing the 
threshold of aggression, both for prosecutors at the ICC and regime elites 
considering the use of force.  The Assembly of States Parties’ adoption 
of the crime of aggression should give pause to decision makers before 
engaging in questionably lawful uses of force. 
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II.  THE THRESHOLD QUESTION AND THE PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL 
FORCE 
A.  The Threshold in the Draft Definition of Aggression 
The International Criminal Court will have a limited mandate to ini-
tiate proceedings into alleged acts of aggression.  The “threshold ques-
tion” in the draft definition of aggression exists to eliminate less signifi-
cant instances of the use of armed force from the ICC’s jurisdiction.2  
Ultimately, the question is whether specific instances of armed force rise 
to the level of criminal aggression.  The issue is framed in terms of the 
gravity of the State conduct.  When alleged acts of unlawful force reach a 
certain level of severity, they cross the threshold of criminal aggression. 
The current draft definition of the crime of aggression, Article 8 bis 
of the Rome Statute, requires that certain factual findings be made prior 
to the initiation of an investigation and prosecution of alleged aggres-
sion.3  Before the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over an offense, an out-
side body must determine that a State has committed an aggressive act.4  
Most commentators agree that this determination will fall either to the 
U.N. Security Council or to another U.N. body if the Security Council 
                                                 
 2. See INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Report of the 
Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 3, ¶ 13, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 9–13, 
2009).  For previous discussions, see INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed fifth 
session, Annex II, Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 11, ¶ 16, 
ICC-ASP/5/35 (Jan. 29–Feb. 1, 2007).  See also Kevin Jon Heller, Progress on Defining the Crime 
of Aggression—But at What Price?, Opinio Juris, Feb. 27, 2007, http://opiniojuris.org/2007/02/27/ 
progress-on-defining-the-crime-of-aggression-but-at-what-price. 
 3. Articles 13–15 of the Rome Statute outline the circumstances under which the ICC may 
exercise jurisdiction.  Article 13 provides that the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the crimes 
listed in Article 5 in the following circumstances: 
(a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is 
referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with Article 14; 
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is 
referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations; or 
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance 
with article 15. 
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13. 
 The draft jurisdictional requirements for the crime of aggression add an additional element to 
this analysis.  Article 15 bis will require that an outside body, likely the Security Council, determine 
that an act of aggression has occurred prior to the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression.  See INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Annex I, 
Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 12–13, Article 15 bis, ICC-
ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 9–13, 2009). 
 4. See INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Annex I, Report 
of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 12–13, Article 15 bis, ICC-
ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (February 9–13, 2009). 
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fails to act.5  Following a determination that a State act is aggression, the 
prosecutor must conclude that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with 
an investigation.6  In order to satisfy this objective jurisdictional re-
quirement, the prosecutor must resolve the issue whether the use of 
armed force rises to the level of criminal aggression. 
The threshold clause provides some jurisdictional guidance and is 
intended to prevent borderline cases from going forward.7  The threshold 
clause has taken several forms during the negotiations of the Special 
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression.  The most recent draft of 
Article 8 bis provides: 
For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a posi-
tion effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or 
military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its cha-
racter, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the 
Charter of the United Nations.8 
This provision emphasizes the nature of acts that constitute criminal ag-
gression.  The delegates to the Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression recognized that in order for criminal responsibility to attach, 
the State act in question must be more than a casual violation of the U.N. 
Charter.9 
Previous drafts of the crime of aggression included language simi-
lar to the “manifest violation” requirement, including draft definitions by 
the International Law Commission10 and the United Nations Preparatory 
                                                 
 5. See id.; see also Keith A. Petty, Sixty Years in the Making: The Definition of Aggression for 
the International Criminal Court, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 531, 536–42 (2008). 
 6. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53(1)(a); see also INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States 
Parties, Resumed seventh session, Annex I, Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression, at 12, Article 15 bis, ¶ 2, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 9–13, 2009). 
 7. See INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Report of the 
Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 3, ¶ 13, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 9–13, 
2009); see also INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed fifth session, Annex II, Re-
port of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 11, ¶ 16, ICC-ASP/5/35 (Jan. 29–
Feb. 1, 2007) (including earlier discussions of the threshold question and aggression generally); see 
also Heller, supra note 2. 
 8. INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Annex I, Report of 
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 11, Article 8 bis, ¶ 1, ICC-
ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 9–13, 2009) (emphasis added). 
 9. See id. at 3, ¶ 13.  For previous discussions, see INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, 
Resumed fifth session, Annex II, Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 
at 11, ¶ 16, ICC-ASP/5/35 (Jan. 29–Feb. 1, 2007); see also Heller, supra note 2. 
 10. Compare INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Report of 
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 9–13, 2009), 
with INT’L LAW COMM’N, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, with 
commentaries, reprinted in Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, vol. II (2), para. 50, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 and 
Corr. 1 and 3 (1996) [hereinafter Draft Code]. 
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Commission for the ICC.11  This language is also consistent with the 
Rome Statute’s establishment provision, which limits the ICC’s reach to 
only “the most serious crimes of international concern.”12 
The threshold clause, however, does not find universal support 
among delegates to the Special Working Group.  Previous drafts of the 
crime included an “object or result” test, which some argue is more con-
sistent with the language of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibiting 
the use of force in violation of the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of another State.13  This option clarifies that a manifest viola-
tion of the U.N. Charter includes State acts such as, “a war of aggression 
or an act which has the object or result of establishing a military occupa-
tion of, or annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof.”14 
Since the early days of the U.N. Charter, aggression has been de-
fined as the use of force that seriously endangers a State’s territorial in-
tegrity or political independence.15  As such, it is argued, a State act 
should be judged in terms of whether it was intended to or actually re-
sults in “a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of another 
State or part thereof”—a clear breach of Article 2(4).16 
Critics of the “object or result” approach argue that it is unjustifia-
bly restrictive.17  Limiting the scope of prosecutable actions further than 
“manifest violations” of the U.N. Charter would have the absurd result of 
rendering the crime of aggression virtually meaningless and unenforce-
able.18  In addition, there is concern that the “object or result” test would 
run afoul of the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege) because 
                                                 
 11. The Preparatory Commission would have required a State act to reach the threshold of a 
“flagrant” violation of the U.N. Charter.  See U.N. Preparatory Comm’n for the ICC, Report of the 
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court (continued), Addendum Part II, Pro-
posals for a provision on the crime of aggression, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2 (July 24, 2002) 
[hereinafter PrepComm Report]. 
 12. Rome Statute, supra note 1.  Some delegates argue that the “manifest violation” require-
ment in the draft definition is redundant with the ICC’s mission of prosecuting only the most serious 
crimes.  Similarly, the limited use of the term “aggression” in the U.N. Charter does not require that 
the definition for aggression specify that the State act be a manifest violation of the Charter.  See 
INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed fifth session, Annex II, Report of the Special 
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 11, ¶ 17, ICC-ASP/5/35 (Jan. 29–Feb. 1, 2007). 
 13. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.  See Part II.B, infra, for a more detailed analysis. 
 14. INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed fifth session, Discussion Paper 
Proposed by the Chairman, at 3, ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/2 (Jan.–Feb. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Discussion 
Paper Proposed by Chairman]. 
 15. See, e.g., DR. C.A. POMPE, AGGRESSIVE WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME 106 (The Ha-
gue, Martinus Nijhoff 1953). 
 16. Discussion Paper Proposed by Chairman, supra note 14, at 3. 
 17. Id. at 11. 
 18. See id. 
110 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:105 
this test was not required in previous legal interpretations of aggression.19  
It is also worth noting that the “object or result” option was removed 
from the most recent draft definition.20 
Beyond the “object or result” approach, some delegates advocate an 
alternative to the draft definition, arguing that the threshold clause should 
be omitted from Article 8 bis altogether.21  They reason that the clause is 
unnecessary because any act of aggression is inherently a manifest viola-
tion of the U.N. Charter.22  Requiring an analysis of the magnitude of 
aggression adds an additional and unnecessary layer to the pre-trial de-
termination—not to mention the elements that must be proven at trial.23  
As such, the Prosecutor should consider only whether the listed acts of 
aggression contained in Article 3 of General Assembly Resolution 3314 
(“GA Resolution 3314”) have occurred.24 
                                                 
 19. Id. at 11, ¶ 18.  See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 22.  See International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 15(1), 1496th plen. mtg. (Dec. 16, 1966) 
(“No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offense on account of any act or omission which did 
not constitute a criminal offense, under national or international law, at the time when it was com-
mitted.”); see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 130–31 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2d ed. 1994). 
 20. INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Annex I, Report of 
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 11, Article 8 bis, ¶ 1, ICC-
ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 9-13, 2009). 
 21. Report of the Cleveland Experts Meeting, The International Criminal Court and the Crime 
of Aggression, September 25–26, 2008, at 6 [hereinafter Report of Cleveland Experts Meeting]. 
 22. See INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Report of the 
Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 3, ¶ 13, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 9–13, 
2009). 
 23. At the February meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, dele-
gates raised the issue of the Elements of Crimes.  Discussion to date has not been conclusive, but 
some expressed that the Elements should be presented at the Review Conference for simultaneous 
adoption to the amendments on aggression.  See INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Re-
sumed seventh session, Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 10, ¶ 
42-44, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 9–13, 2009). 
 24. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974).  Article 3 states the 
following: 
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in ac-
cordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as aggression: (a) The invasion or attack 
by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, 
however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use 
of force of the territory of another State or part thereof; (b) Bombardment by the armed 
forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State 
against the territory of another State; (c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by 
the armed forces of another State; (d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the 
land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State; (e) The use of armed 
forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of 
the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or 
any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of an-
other State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a 
third State; (g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars 
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Proposals to eliminate the threshold clause overlook several key 
considerations.  First, GA Resolution 3314 was adopted to guide the Se-
curity Council in making determinations of aggression.25  It was not 
adopted for the purpose of attaching individual criminal responsibility to 
a crime.26  Second, basing a definition of aggression on acts alone fails 
the nullum crimen sine lege requirement in criminal law.27  There must 
be a mental element—mens rea—to accompany criminal acts.28  Other-
wise at least part of the definition is impermissibly ambiguous, failing to 
provide adequate notice to would-be violators.  Finally, looking to acts 
alone without any reference to possible exceptions undermines the pur-
pose of the threshold clause altogether—to remove borderline cases from 
the jurisdiction of the ICC.29 
Many delegates to the Special Working Group are confident that 
the “manifest violation” language will serve the purpose of excluding 
questionable cases, those not surpassing the threshold of aggression, 
from prosecution.30  The Chairman to the Special Working Group has 
also noted that the magnitude test contained in the threshold clause finds 
strong support among the delegates.31  The analysis in this article, there-
fore, proceeds under the assumption that the definition of aggression will 
retain the threshold clause present in the February 2009 draft.32 
The current draft of Article 8 bis sets out a definition of the “crime 
of aggression”33 as well as a definition of “act[s] of aggression.”34  The 
distinction—between a crime and acts constituting part of the crime—
clearly establishes a hierarchical analysis.  Before a crime of aggression 
                                                                                                             
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity 
as to amount to the acts listed above or its substantial involvement therein. 
Id. 
 25. INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Report of the Spe-
cial Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 4, ¶ 17, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 9–13, 
2009). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 22; see also ICCPR, art. 15(1). 
 28. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 30. 
 29. INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Report of the Spe-
cial Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 3, ¶ 13, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 9–13, 
2009). 
 30. INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed fifth session, Annex II, Report of 
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 11, ¶ 16, ICC-ASP/5/35 (Jan. 29–Feb. 1, 
2007); see also Heller, supra note 2. 
 31. Press Conference by Chairman of Working Group on Crime of Aggression (Jan. 31, 2007), 
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2007/070131_Wenaweser.doc.htm. 
 32. INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Report of the Spe-
cial Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 11, Article 8 bis, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 
9–13, 2009). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.; see also G.A. Res., supra note 24, art. 3. 
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can be established, there must be an act of aggression.35  If this act is a 
“manifest violation” of the U.N. Charter, then it may be a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
Therefore, there will inevitably be a two-step analysis.  First, it 
must be determined whether a State act of aggression has occurred.  As 
discussed above, this initial determination will likely be made by the Se-
curity Council as a condition precedent to the prosecutor initiating an 
investigation.36  The ICC will likely consider a Security Council finding 
of aggression as non-binding but highly persuasive evidence that aggres-
sion has occurred.37 Once this initial determination is made, the prosecu-
tor must determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the 
act of aggression constitutes a manifest violation of the U.N. Charter.38 
The following parts discuss the two-step analysis in detail.  State 
acts of aggression are analyzed in Part II.B in the context of the prohibi-
tions and legal exceptions to the use of force as found in the U.N. Charter 
and GA Resolution 3314.  The second step, determining what a “mani-
fest violation” of the U.N. Charter entails, is discussed in Part II.C.  Ul-
timately, resolution of the threshold question may reside in the intent of 
the aggressor State’s decision makers.  These sections provide the legal 
framework for the discussion in Parts III and IV concerning whether hu-
manitarian intervention and certain measures against terrorism cross the 
threshold of aggression. 
B.  The Use of Force and State Acts of Aggression 
The first issue that must be resolved prior to initiating an investiga-
tion into the crime of aggression is to determine whether an act of ag-
gression occurred.39  This determination necessarily requires an analysis 
                                                 
 35. It is notable that the definition for an “act of aggression” is very broad.  The scope covers 
any use of armed force against another State’s (a) sovereignty, (b) territorial integrity, (c) political 
independence, or (d) any other manner inconsistent with the U.N. Charter.  The manifest violation 
requirement of paragraph 1 to Article 8 bis is intended to narrow the possible violations to only those 
of sufficient gravity to warrant investigation and prosecution of alleged aggression. 
 36. INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Annex I, Report of 
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 12, Article 15 bis, ¶ 2, ICC-
ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 9–13, 2009). 
 37. See, e.g., Keith A. Petty, Sixty Years in the Making: The Definition of Aggression for the 
International Criminal Court, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 531 (2008); Dr. Troy Lavers, 
[Pre]determining the Crime of Aggression: Has the Time Come to Allow the International Criminal 
Court its Freedom?, 71 ALB. L. REV. 299 (2008); Mark S. Stein, The Security Council, The Interna-
tional Criminal Court, and the Crime of Aggression: How Exclusive is the Security Council’s Power 
to Determine Aggression?, 16 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
 38. INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Annex I, Report of 
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 12, Article 15 bis, ¶ 2, ICC-
ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 9–13, 2009). 
 39. Id. 
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of the lawfulness of the use of force, referred to as the “jus ad bellum.”40  
Centuries of the just-war tradition,41 custom,42 and treaties43 resulted in 
the legal framework prohibiting the use of aggressive force.  The U.N. 
Charter is the most recent treaty-based prohibition of State aggression.44  
While State acts of aggression have been historically prohibited, it was 
not until the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg that individu-
als were held responsible for the crime of aggression.45  Following the 
precedent of Nuremburg, the Rome Statute provides for individual ac-
countability for “the most serious crimes of international concern.”46  
The interplay between the U.N. Charter’s prohibition of certain State 
conduct and the Rome Statute’s prohibition of individual conduct is es-
sential to understanding the two-part analysis of criminal aggression. 
1.  The Prohibition on the Aggressive Use of Force 
The overall purpose of the United Nations is unmistakable—to 
maintain peace and security among nations.47  The preamble to the U.N. 
Charter reaffirms the members’ goal that “armed force shall not be used, 
save in the common interest.”48  Article 2(3) states that “[a]ll Members 
shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a man-
ner that international peace and security, and justice, shall not be com-
promised.”49  The bedrock of any discussion on the use of force, how-
ever, is Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.50  Article 2(4) states: 
                                                 
 40. For a detailed discussion of the origins of “jus ad bellum,” see Keith A. Petty, Sixty Years 
in the Making: The Definition of Aggression For the International Criminal Court, 31 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 531, 533–34 (2008). 
 41. POMPE, supra note 15; ANTHONY CLARK & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 11-16 (Routledge 1993); IAN 
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 5 (Oxford University Press, 
1993). 
 42. The Nicaragua case noted that Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter reflects custom.  Military 
and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100 (June 27).  Moreover, some maintain 
that the prohibition on the use of force is a non-derogable, peremptory norm, otherwise known as 
“jus cogens.”  See id., para. 190.  See also ILC Commentaries to Articles on State Responsibility, 
Commentary to Article 40(4). 
 43. Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the Renunciation of War 
as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. 
 44. U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4. 
 45. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6(a).  Individual criminal responsibility 
attached to “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation 
of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy 
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”  Id. 
 46. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 1. 
 47. U.N. Charter, art. 1, para. 1. 
 48. Id. at pmbl. 
 49. Id. art. 2, para. 3. 
 50. Id. art. 2, para. 4. 
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All members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations.51 
Therefore, when the U.N. Security Council, and later the prosecutor of 
the ICC, determines whether an aggressive act has occurred, it will look 
first to Article 2(4) of the Charter. 
G.A. Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of December 14, 1974 was adopted 
to guide the Security Council in this determination.52  The Resolution 
sets out a series of specific acts by States, or non-State actors on behalf 
of States, which if used to violate the territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of another State, will constitute aggression.53  For the pur-
poses of the ICC, these acts serve as an illustrative list of State acts of 
aggression and are incorporated directly into Article 8 bis of the draft 
definition.54 
Article 8 bis, paragraph 2 defines “act of aggression” as it relates to 
the underlying crime.  It provides: 
For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use 
of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity or political independence of another State, or in any other man-
ner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.  Any of the 
following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accor-
dance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 
(XXIX) of 13 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression.55 
This paragraph is followed by seven sub-paragraphs, (a)–(g), which list 
specific acts of aggression taken directly from Article 3 of GA Resolu-
tion 3314.56  This provision is the starting point for the prosecutor when 
an alleged act of aggression has been referred to the ICC.  As previously 
discussed, there are some who argue that the list of acts in Article 3 of 
GA Resolution 3314 should be the only consideration in a determination 
                                                 
 51. Id. 
 52. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 24. 
 53. For these specific acts, see G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 24, art. 3. 
 54. INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Annex I, Report of 
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 11–12, Article 8 bis, ¶ 2, ICC-
ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 9–13, 2009).  Some members of the Special Working Group were con-
cerned that listing the acts of aggression would be too restrictive.  Ultimately, the Group decided to 
consider the list of acts as a non-exhaustive list of possible ways that acts of aggression can be com-
mitted.  Id. at 4, ¶ 17. 
 55. Id. at 11–12, Article 8 bis, ¶ 2. 
 56. See excerpt, supra note 22. 
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of aggression.57  This, however, fails to take into account lawful uses of 
force, including the right to self-defense, discussed below.58 
2.  Lawful Uses of Force 
The prohibition on the use of force is not absolute.  That there is a 
threshold question in the definition of aggression makes obvious that the 
use of force is lawful in certain circumstances and criminalized in others.  
Only unlawful uses of coercive force violate the U.N. Charter, and, as 
such, only the most serious of those violations constitute aggression.  
Under the Charter, the use of force is permissible for self-defense pur-
poses under Article 5159 or when the Security Council authorizes coer-
cive force under its Chapter VII authority.60 
The Charter provides clear examples of the lawful use of force.  
First, the Security Council might authorize State action.61  Second, self-
defense, as recognized in Article 51 of the Charter is the most relied 
upon justification for the use of force.  Article 51 of the Charter states: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of in-
dividual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs against 
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has tak-
en measures necessary to maintain international peace and secu-
rity.62 
As the lawful use of force applies to aggression, no definition may 
expand or restrict the scope of the lawful uses of force under the U.N. 
Charter.63 
The definition of aggression does not appear to limit the lawful uses 
of force in the current draft.  Specifically, in paragraph 2 of Article 8 bis, 
the phrase, “in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations,” both maintains the consistency of Article 2(4) of the 
U.N. Charter (also seen in Article 1 of GA Resolution 3314),64 and al-
lows for the criminalization of acts of aggression not anticipated by the 
drafters of the U.N. Charter or GA Resolution 3314.  Moreover, this pro-
vision does not restrict uses of force that are consistent with the U.N. 
Charter, such as actions authorized under the Security Council’s Chapter 
                                                 
 57. See text and accompanying notes, supra Part II.A. 
 58. See infra Part IV. 
 59. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 60. Id. art. 42. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. art. 51. 
 63. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 24, art. 6. 
 64. INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Report of the Spe-
cial Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 4, ¶ 15, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2, (February 9–13, 
2009). 
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VII power and the inherent right of self-defense enumerated in Article 
51.65 
Determining whether an act of aggression has occurred may be the 
most straightforward step in the analysis.  When Iraqi tanks rolled over 
the Kuwait border in 1990, or when NATO bombs dropped in Kosovo, 
there was little doubt whether one of the enumerated acts in GA Resolu-
tion 3314 had occurred.  The second step—determining that these acts 
are a manifest violation of the U.N. Charter, and, therefore, a crime of 
aggression—will prove more difficult to even a skilled prosecutor. 
C.  The Magnitude Analysis: The Crime of Aggression 
The “manifest violation” element in the draft definition of aggres-
sion requires an inquiry into the magnitude of the unlawful use of force.  
That the act must be more than an illegal application of force is clear by 
the use of the term “manifest,” meaning clear, apparent, evident.66  Be-
sides the plain language,67 there is further evidence that the magnitude 
test of acts of aggression was intended to exclude mere facial violations 
of the U.N. Charter.  For example, States “wishing to raise the threshold 
yet higher—some intending to distinguish humanitarian intervention 
from aggression—continue to promote the ‘manifest’ or ‘flagrant’ quali-
fier.”68 
The requirement to weigh the severity of acts is prominent in the 
Rome Statute.  Article 17(d) requires the Pre-trial Chamber to weigh the 
gravity of any alleged offense in order to determine whether a case is 
admissible before the ICC.69  The prosecutor must also weigh the gravity 
of an alleged offense prior to initiating an investigation or prosecution.70 
With respect to determining whether aggression has occurred, Arti-
cle 2 of GA Resolution 3314 provides the Security Council with guid-
                                                 
 65. See infra Part III (discussing the use of humanitarian intervention and its consistency with 
the UN Charter). 
 66. INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression, fifth session, Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 8, 
ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/1 (Nov. 29, 2006). 
 67. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, para. 1, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
31, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose.”). 
 68. Noah Weisbord, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT’L L. J. 161, 186 (2008).  Contrary 
to the prevalent view that the threshold should be high, some delegates to the Special Working 
Group would prefer no threshold at all.  Id. at 186.  Some experts agree, arguing that the commission 
of one of the listed acts set out in G.A. Resolution 3314 is sufficient, and that there does not need to 
be a further analysis into the “magnitude” of these acts raising them to the level of aggression.  Re-
port of Cleveland Experts Meeting, supra note 21, at 6. 
 69. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(d). 
 70. Id. art. 53. 
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ance on weighing the acts in question to determine whether aggression 
has occurred as follows: 
[T]he Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, con-
clude that a determination that an act of aggression has been com-
mitted would not be justified in the light of other relevant circum-
stances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their conse-
quences are not of sufficient gravity.71 
However, the current draft definition does not include Article 2 of GA 
Resolution 3314.72  Even if this provision is not incorporated into the 
definition of aggression, experts agree that the Security Council may still 
sanction the use of force after the fact.73  Moreover, the exclusion of Ar-
ticle 2 may be justified because the consideration of the gravity of the 
offense is captured in other articles of the Rome Statute relating to ad-
missibility (Article 17) and initiating investigations and prosecutions 
(Article 53). 
The magnitude analysis required for other offenses within the juris-
diction of the ICC is instructive when determining whether the “charac-
ter, gravity, and scale” of the act of aggression is a “manifest violation” 
of the U.N. Charter.  Crimes against humanity and war crimes each re-
quire a magnitude analysis before they come within the jurisdiction of 
the ICC.  In his seminal work, International Criminal Law, Antonio Cas-
sesse describes the Tadic case at the International Law Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY).  In discussing the interlocutory appeal ruling, 
he states: 
[W]ar crimes must consist of ‘a serious infringement’ of an interna-
tional rule, that is to say ‘must constitute a breach of a rule protect-
ing important values, and the breach must involve grave conse-
quences for the victim,’ . . . [and] ‘the violation must entail, under 
customary or conventional law, the individual criminal responsibil-
ity of the person breaching the rule.’74 
                                                 
 71. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 24, art. 2. 
 72. See INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Annex I, Re-
port of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 11-12, Article 8 bis, ¶ 2, ICC-
ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 9-13, 2009).  This issue involves the trigger mechanism of jurisdiction more 
than the threshold question.  Nonetheless, the Security Council’s determination will likely factor into 
which cases are deemed crimes of aggression by the ICC prosecutor.  See discussion supra notes 31–
35.  While some question remains as to the ability of the prosecutor to proceed with a case in light of 
a Security Council determination of non-aggression, there can be no doubt that the Pre-trial Chamber 
must similarly weigh the gravity of the alleged offense to determine whether a case is admissible.  
Rome Statute, supra  note 1, art. 17(d). 
 73. See Report of Cleveland Experts Meeting, supra note  21, at 6. 
 74. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 47 (2003) (citing Tadic Interlocutory 
Appeal, at 94). 
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An act that is a specific breach of the law of war may be sufficient to 
constitute a war crime if similar breaches have been considered a war 
crime by national or international courts in the past.75 
Crimes against humanity also require a magnitude test.  The alleged 
criminal acts must be “widespread or systematic” in order for the ICC to 
exercise jurisdiction.76  In the Jelisic Trial Judgment at the ICTY, the 
ICC held that factors to consider when determining whether acts were 
“widespread or systematic” includes “the number of victims” and  “the 
employment of considerable financial, military or other resources and the 
scale or the repeated, unchanging and continuous nature of the violence 
committed against a particular civilian population.”77 
Similarly, the crime of aggression will not apply to uses of force on 
a smaller scale.  For example, “border skirmishes, cross-border artillery, 
armed incursions, and similar situations should not fall under the defini-
tion of aggression.”78  David Scheffer proposes a substantiality test for 
determining when an “atrocity crime” occurs.  The first part of his test is 
as follows: 
The crime must be of significant magnitude, meaning that its com-
mission is widespread or systematic or occurs as part of a large-
scale commission of such crimes.  The crime must involve a rela-
tively large number of victims . . . or impose other very severe in-
jury upon noncombatant populations . . . or subject a large number 
of combatants or prisoners of war to violations of the laws and cus-
toms of war.79 
Acts of aggression must be analyzed in the context of their severity 
like the magnitude or substantiality tests applied to the other crimes with-
in the ICC’s jurisdiction.  But in contrast to the weight given to the num-
ber of casualties or the involvement of the State for crimes against hu-
manity or war crimes, the threshold of criminal aggression may ulti-
mately depend on the mental state of the alleged aggressor.  Simply put, 
armed intervention may be on a very large scale for the purposes of hu-
                                                 
 75. Id. at 51. 
 76. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7. 
 77. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, para. 53 (Dec. 14, 1999), cited in 
David Scheffer, Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility to Protect, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 
111, 122 (2008). 
 78. Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, Completing the Work of the Preparatory Commission: 
The Working Group on Aggression at the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal 
Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 589, 597 (2002). 
 79. Scheffer, supra note 77, at 118.  Scheffer’s discussion takes place in the context of deter-
mining when humanitarian intervention, or the responsibility to protect, is appropriate.  As such, his 
substantiality test is a threshold for applying force to combat atrocity crimes. In the context of the 
threshold of aggression, however, this test can be readily applied to the analysis of manifest viola-
tions of the U.N. Charter. 
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manitarian intervention, but the aggressor may not intend to violate the 
territorial integrity of the target State.  Rather the intent is to end an 
atrocity crime.  The application of the threshold question to specific in-
stances of military force is discussed in the following parts. 
III.  APPLICATION OF THE DRAFT DEFINITION TO HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 
Having established the various principles regulating the use of 
force, the issue becomes whether certain uses of armed force cross the 
threshold of unlawful aggression in the context of modern conflict.  In 
recent years, humanitarian intervention and actions to combat terrorism 
have stretched the boundaries of the lawful use of force.  This Part ad-
dresses the issues raised by humanitarian intervention.  In light of the 
forthcoming adoption of a definition of aggression, one must consider 
whether it is possible for humanitarian intervention to be a “manifest vio-
lation” of the U.N. Charter.  If not every “unauthorized” use of force is 
sufficiently serious to amount to criminal aggression, where is the line 
drawn?80 
The use of humanitarian intervention and whether it rises to the 
level of a manifest violation of the U.N. Charter has been the subject of 
great debate and remains a legal uncertainty.  Competing theories state 
that humanitarian intervention is (1) unlawful unless authorized by the 
U.N. Security Council;81 (2) lawful with sufficient cause;82 and (3) un-
lawful, but justifiable on other, non-legal grounds.83 
Humanitarian intervention has been defined as “the threat or use of 
force by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily 
for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from wide-
spread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights.”84  This 
definition is to be applied “whether or not the intervention is authorized 
                                                 
 80. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103–04 (June 27). 
 81. See, e.g., Jianming Shen, The Non-Intervention Principle and Humanitarian Interventions 
Under International Law, 7 INT’L LEGAL THEORY, 1, 6 (2001). 
 82. See, e.g., Amy Eckert, The Non-Intervention Principle and International Humanitarian 
Interventions, 7 INT’L LEGAL THEORY, 27 (2001). 
 83. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of ‘Humanitarian Intervention,’ 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 824, (1999). 
 84. SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN 
EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 11–12 (1996).  Note that this definition does not include humanitarian 
actions taken to protect a State’s own nationals.  An example of this is Israel’s commando operation 
in Entebbe, Uganda in 1976 to rescue Israeli hijack victims.  See id. at 15; see also HELEN DUFFY, 
THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 178 (2005) (citing 
CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 26 (2001)). 
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by the target state or the international community.”85  Acts of humanitar-
ian intervention have been central to the discussion of the threshold ques-
tion during various phases of drafting the definition of aggression.  For 
example, in the 1990s, the ICC Preparatory Committee, the U.N. group 
responsible for drafting the statute for the ICC, discussed humanitarian 
intervention and other exceptions to the prohibited uses of force.86  More 
recently, the delegates to the Special Working Group were “confident 
[the manifest violation requirement] will prevent borderline cases from 
going before the [ICC].” 87 
Determining whether humanitarian intervention falls safely within 
the “borderline cases” and therefore outside the ICC’s jurisdiction, or 
whether such actions are unlawful aggression hinges on the outcome of 
the two-step analysis for manifest violations of the U.N. Charter.88  Be-
fore the attachment of criminal responsibility, the act itself must be de-
termined to be unlawful.  Once this is determined, the character, gravity, 
and scale of the violation of the U.N. Charter must be weighed in order 
to assess the potential criminality of the use of force. 
A.  The Questionable Legality of Humanitarian Intervention 
That humanitarian intervention is a prima facie violation of Article 
2(4) of the U.N. Charter is not controversial.89  Humanitarian interven-
tion, as defined above, necessarily requires the use of force by a State or 
group of states in violation of the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of another State.  Moreover, “the explicit language of the U.N. 
Charter, as repeatedly and authoritatively construed, does not allow ac-
tions to prevent or arrest mass killings without Security Council authori-
zation.”90 
Severe human rights violations and atrocity crimes within a State 
have been linked to the Security Council’s responsibility to maintain in-
ternational peace and security.91  Among the first internal incidents to 
garner the attention of the Security Council was the 1966 rebellion in 
                                                 
 85. MURPHY, supra note 84, at 3–4. 
 86. Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Court, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.249/1997/WG.1/DP.20 (Dec. 11, 1997). 
 87. INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed fifth session, Annex II, Report of 
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 11, ¶ 16, ICC-ASP/5/35 (Jan. 29-Feb. 1, 
2007); see also Heller, supra note 2; Petty, supra note 5, at 543. 
 88. See discussion, supra Part II.C. 
 89. DUFFY, supra note 84, at 179–80.  See also MURPHY, supra note 84, at 12. 
 90. W. Michael Reisman, Acting Before Victims Become Victims: Preventing and Arresting 
Mass Murder, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 57, 78 (2008). 
 91. U.N. Charter, art. 24, para. 1. 
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Southern Rhodesia.92  During the 1990s, the Security Council turned to 
issues of humanitarian concern more often, including the Iraq-Kuwait 
situation,93 the Somalia intervention,94 and the mission in Haiti.95  Even 
in the Resolution on Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Security Council 
linked the humanitarian crisis to a threat to regional peace and security.96  
These examples underscore that the authority for actions related to grave 
human rights violations remains with the Security Council under its 
Chapter VII powers.  There is otherwise “no consensus on a right of uni-
lateral ‘humanitarian intervention’ to protect victims of large-scale hu-
man rights violations, including genocides and mass killings.”97 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has traditionally supported 
the position that States may not unilaterally use force against other States 
for the purposes of humanitarian intervention.  Rather, any use of coer-
cive force must be sanctioned by the Security Council or qualify as self-
defense.  In the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ interpreted Article 2(4) of 
the U.N. Charter to preclude implicit exceptions to the prohibition on the 
use of force.98  In Nicaragua, the ICJ held that the prohibition on the use 
of force was a customary international law norm independent of the U.N. 
Charter paradigm.99  Furthermore, the ICJ added that the use of force is 
not the appropriate mechanism to prevent human rights violations in an-
                                                 
 92. Sec.Council Res. 232, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 (Dec. 16, 1966); see also Reisman, 
supra note 90, at 71. 
 93. On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait, ostensibly over an oil drilling dis-
pute.  The United Nations responded with Security Council Resolution 688.  Sec.Council Res. 688, 
para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991), cited in Reisman, supra note 90, at 72 (citing SUSAN 
BREAU, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS & COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 238 
(2005)).  Reisman indicates that as far as the Security Council is concerned, the Iraq/Kuwait crisis 
marked the “first clear link between human rights violations within a state and international peace 
and security.”  Reisman, supra note 90, at 72 n.47;  see also DUFFY, supra note 84, at 180 (citing the 
Statement of the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, justifying the action on hu-
manitarian grounds, reported in GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 30 (2004)). 
 94. The United Nations established the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to stabilize the civil 
breakdown and humanitarian crisis in Somalia caused by a civil war between rival warlords and their 
factions.  Sec. Council Res. 794, para. 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992), cited in Reisman, 
supra note 90, at 72. 
 95. In 2004, the United Nations authorized a peacekeeping force to respond to large scale civil 
unrest in Haiti following a coup d’état that led to the premature resignation of President Aristide.  
See DUFFY, supra note 84, at 184. 
 96. Sec. Council Res. 713, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (Sept. 21, 1991), cited in Reisman, supra 
note 90, at 72. 
 97. Reisman, supra note 90, at 78. 
 98. Corfu Channel Case (Alb. v. U.K.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9) (rejecting the U.K.’s self-defense 
argument in clearing minefields near the Albanian coast when the Security Council was unable to 
resolve the matter), cited in Reisman, supra note 90, at 77. 
 99. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (finding that 
the United States violated international law by supporting guerilla forces attempting to overthrow the 
Nicaraguan government and by mining Nicaragua’s harbors), cited in Reisman, supra note 90, at 77. 
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other State.100  The ICJ confirmed in the Nuclear Weapons case that self-
defense under Article 51 and the Security Council’s Chapter VII author-
ity are the only two exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of 
force.101  The ICJ drew the line drawn even more brightly in DRC v. 
Uganda, stating that in spite of the Security Council’s recognition of 
States’ responsibility for peace in the region, Uganda was not authorized 
to use military force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.102 
The draft definition of aggression does not provide an exception for 
humanitarian intervention.  The acts prohibited by Article 3 of GA Reso-
lution 3314 would cover even those acts taken for humanitarian pur-
poses.  GA Resolution 3314 specifically treats occupation of any dura-
tion (even if to stand in the way of a genocidal armed force or militia) as 
an act of aggression.  Thus, the black letter of the law would prohibit 
humanitarian interventions. 
GA Resolution 3314 is significant for each component of the thre-
shold analysis.  First, it serves as a guide to the Security Council in de-
termining whether a State committed an act of aggression.  Second, and 
more importantly, the prohibited acts in 3314 will likely be adopted di-
rectly into the definition of aggression, if not implicitly referenced.103  
Specifically, the current draft definition provides that “acts of aggres-
sion” include the use of force “against the sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.”104  This can be read 
broadly to capture any outlying instances of the use of force not contem-
plated by the general prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4). 
For some, geo-political concerns give pause to considerations of 
exceptions to the general prohibition against the use of armed force in 
Article 2(4).105  As indicated by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case: “while the 
                                                 
 100. Id. 
 101. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 
(Jul. 8) (responding to a U.N. General Assembly request for an advisory opinion to the question, “Is 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances permitted under international law?”), cited 
in Reisman, supra note 90, at 77. 
 102. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. of the Con-
go v. Uganda) (Judgment of Dec. 19, 2005) para. 152, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf (where the ICJ held that Uganda violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter and international human rights and humanitarian law when it conducted military operations 
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 103. See INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Annex I 
Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 11-12, Article 8 bis, ¶ 2(a)–(g), 
ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 9–13, 2009). 
 104. Id. at 11 (emphasis added). 
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debating the Israeli Entebbe incident in Uganda, at Sec. Council 1940th meeting, in CHESTERMAN, 
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USA might form its own appraisal of the situation as to respect for hu-
man rights in Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the appropriate 
method to monitor or ensure such respect.”106 
However, in spite of a lack of consensus on the legality of humani-
tarian intervention without Security Council authorization, there is a 
growing body of scholarship that supports humanitarian intervention on 
both legal and policy grounds.107  As discussed below, this would remove 
humanitarian intervention from cases that could be considered manifest 
violations of the U.N. Charter, and therefore preclude individual respon-
sibility for criminal aggression. 
B.  Humanitarian Intervention as a Non-Manifest Violation of the U.N. 
Charter 
Despite numerous attempts by scholars to create an operational 
framework, the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention is not well-
settled.108  Nonetheless, at least two primary arguments have emerged to 
justify the use of humanitarian intervention.109  First, humanitarian inter-
vention is not inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N. Charter.  Sec-
ond, the right of unilateral humanitarian intervention, like the right of 
self-defense, is part of customary international law (emerging or real-
ized).  Although the debate about the legality of humanitarian interven-
tion will continue, the legitimacy of such actions tends to preclude indi-
vidual criminal responsibility for aggression. 
1.  Fundamental Principles of the U.N. Charter 
Humanitarian intervention and the protection of human rights are 
consistent with at least one of the underlying purposes of the United Na-
tions.110  The fundamental principles of the U.N. Charter are the regula-
                                                 
 106. GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 28 (2004).  Note, however, that the 
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tion of the use of force,111 the protection of sovereignty,112 and the pro-
motion of human rights.113  Far from a manifest violation of the U.N. 
Charter, the use of force in furtherance of humanitarian principles, in 
certain circumstances, is in accord with the general purpose of the United 
Nations because such actions would appear to comport with the human-
rights priorities of the Charter.114 
Additionally, it is instructive to examine the subsequent practice of 
U.N. Member States (and organs of the United Nations) when interpret-
ing the general prohibition of unlawful force.  The subsequent practice of 
parties to an agreement is taken into account when interpreting a trea-
ty.115  As such, many believe the U.N. Charter to be a living instrument 
responsive to “the new challenges of the contemporary world.”116  There 
are numerous examples of how the evolving practice of humanitarian 
intervention is transforming the boundaries of the prohibition of the un-
lawful use of force.  For example, since 1990 there have been at least 
seventeen instances of humanitarian intervention.117 
In this context, States’ use of force to prevent or arrest large scale 
atrocities, without the Article 51 self-defense rationale or Security Coun-
cil authorization, does not have the “character” of a manifest violation of 
the U.N. Charter.118  The reason for this is apparent, even though any 
intervention could be classified under the prohibited acts of aggression in 
GA Resolution 3314.  In launching an attack against a government that is 
undertaking a genocidal campaign against a segment of its population, 
the attacking State does not have as its purpose the violation of the tar-
geted State’s territorial integrity or political independence.  Rather, the 
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ter, there is a significant contingent of experts and scholars that would preclude the use of force as a 
counter measure against international wrongs.  See ILC Articles on State Responsibility, art. 50. 
 115. Vienna Convention, supra note 67, art. 31, para. 3(a)-(b) (“There shall be taken into ac-
count . . . any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or 
the application of its provisions [and] any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”).  See also, Reparation for Inju-
ries suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 180. 
 116. DUFFY, supra note 84, at 149 (citing FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION 
AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS, 5–9 (2002); G. Ress, “Interpretation,” in CHARTER OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS, A COMMENTARY 13, 27 (Brunno Simma et al. eds. 2002). 
 117. Williams & Stewart, supra note 108, at 98. 
 118. FENTON, supra note 109, at 14 (citing Michael L. Burton, Legalising the Sublegal: A 
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attacking State seeks to protect the rights of genocide victims.  As such, 
the “character” of the campaign would not amount to a manifest viola-
tion of the U.N. Charter.  More specifically, the nature of the attack 
would neither be “against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State,” nor, arguably, would it be conducted in 
“any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Na-
tions.”119 
2.  Customary “Right” of Intervention 
Humanitarian intervention has also been justified on the basis of ei-
ther a pre-existing or an emerging customary right to intervene.120  
Where the U.N. Security Council fails to authorize action, it is argued, 
the pre-Charter customary right of humanitarian intervention may super-
sede Charter limits on the use of force.121  Some maintain that, in this 
instance, international law allows States to intervene to avert a “grave 
humanitarian crisis”122 or “humanitarian catastrophe.”123  This unilateral 
assertion of humanitarian intervention is not to be confused with the use 
of U.N.-sanctioned force for humanitarian purposes.124 
More compelling than claims of a pre-existing right to intervene are 
the arguments that a customary norm is emerging.125  Under this theory, a 
State loses its right to sovereign integrity when it fails to maintain a min-
                                                 
 119. INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Annex I, Report 
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against Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (quoting House of Commons Hazard Debates, 26 February 
2001 (justifying the UK enforcement of Iraq no-fly zones)). 
 123. DUFFY, supra note 84, at 179 (citing W.M. Reisman, Coercion and Self Determination: 
Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM J. INT’L L. 64 (1984)); F. TESON, HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY, (2d ed. New York, 1997).  See generally 
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Res. 232 (1966), 16 December 1966, UN Doc. S/RES/232 (1966)); see also Mohammed Ayoob, 
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MANAGEMENT IN A DIVIDED WORLD 110 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 2007) (arguing that cases 
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vention in Iraq in 2003, which undermine the authority of the Security Council). 
 125. Reisman, supra note 90, at 78–9. 
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imum standard of conduct toward its citizens.126  Over the past twenty 
years, several practical examples, as well as official reports and state-
ments, lend credibility to this approach, further precluding criminal re-
sponsibility for humanitarian intervention. 
In 1990, a group of West African States sent a military peacekeep-
ing force (ECOMOG) to intervene in a civil war in Liberia notable for 
large-scale human rights abuses.127  Although the Security Council did 
not authorize ECOMOG’s actions, U.N. Member States treated the inter-
vention favorably.128  In 1995, recognizing that States had the tool of 
humanitarian intervention available to them, then Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that: “The United Nations does not have or 
claim a monopoly of any of these instruments.  All can be, and most of 
them have been, employed by regional organizations, by ad hoc groups 
of States or by individual States . . . .”129 
The latest incarnation of humanitarian intervention is now dis-
cussed in terms of the responsibility to protect.130  Under this theory, the 
norm of non-intervention must give way when a State commits genocide 
or crimes against humanity on its own territory.131  This approach was 
first reflected in a report by the International Commission on Interven-
tion and State Sovereignty (ICISS).  The Commission recognized that 
the responsibility to protect its people from killing and other grave 
harm was the most basic and fundamental of all the responsibilities 
that sovereignty imposes—and if a state cannot or will not protect 
its people from such harm, then coercive intervention for human 
protection purposes, including ultimately military intervention, by 
others in the international community may be warranted in extreme 
cases.132 
                                                 
 126. The right to intervene is now referred to as the “responsibility to protect.”  See Williams 
& Stewart, supra note 108, at 105; see also Scheffer, supra note 77. 
 127. Reisman, supra note 90, at 78–9. 
 128. Id. 
 129. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organiza-
tion, para. 23, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the 
Occasion of the Fifteenth Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1 (Jan. 3, 
1995), cited in Reisman, supra note 90, at 76. 
 130. Williams & Stewart, supra note 108, at 105. 
 131. Ambassador Richard N. Haass, Sovereignty, Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities: 
Remarks Presented at Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service, 14 January 2003, in 
STEINER, ALSTON, ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 698 (Oxford 
2008).  See also, Richard Falk, Sovereignty and Human Dignity: The Search for Reconciliation 
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In 2004, the Secretary-General scaled back the scope of unilateral 
action in the report by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, which stated that military intervention in furtherance of the re-
sponsibility to protect was “exercisable by the Security Council.”133  This 
signified a return to the strict interpretation of authorization of the use of 
force found in the U.N. Charter framework, which would trend toward 
limiting military actions for humanitarian purposes to those with explicit 
Security Council authorization. 
The General Assembly found a middle option when it voted on the 
declaration for the 2005 World Summit Outcome.  The declaration pro-
vides that “[e]ach individual State has the responsibility to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.  This responsibility entails the prevention of such 
crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means.” 134 
The most promising indication of an emerging norm is the ICJ’s 
opinion in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Her-
zegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)—the “Genocide Case.”135  With 
respect to the crime of genocide, the ICJ held that “the obligation of 
States parties is rather to employ all means reasonably available to them, 
so as to prevent genocide so far as possible.”136  This decision suggests 
that States not only have legal authority to unilaterally use force to pre-
                                                                                                             
(ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect at 69 (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 
2001)) (italics added).  For further discussion of the ICISS Report, see Scheffer, supra note 77, at 
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ed); see also Sec. Council Res. 1674, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006) (“[The Secu-
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cide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 169 (Feb. 26), available at http://www.icj-
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vent atrocities, but they may even have an obligation to do so.137  In spite 
of pronouncements like this by the ICJ, proponents of humanitarian in-
tervention, and its cousin the responsibility to protect, must still argue 
against a history of State interventions that did not fully embrace the le-
gal basis behind such actions. 
In practice, military interventions with a human rights component 
are often based on other legal grounds, such as enforcement of Security 
Council resolutions or self-defense.  Examples include India’s involve-
ment in East Pakistan in 1971,138 Vietnam’s cross-border incursion into 
Cambodia in 1978,139 and Tanzania’s actions against Idi Amin’s Uganda 
in 1979.140  These and other humanitarian actions did not receive consis-
tent condemnation.  But rather than express an emerging legal norm, the 
non-condemnation of humanitarian intervention may be the result of 
non-legal, moral justifications, or even the inadequacy of international 
enforcement mechanisms in prohibiting the use of unlawful force.141 
The NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 is a particularly cogent 
example of States’ reluctance to rely exclusively on humanitarian justifi-
cations to use force to stop widespread human rights violations.142  Most 
States, including the United States, relied on enforcement of Security 
Council Resolutions 1199 and 1203 even though these resolutions did 
not authorize armed intervention.143  The United Kingdom came the 
closest to using a strictly humanitarian basis for action prior to the inter-
vention,144 but seemed to take a more cautious position after NATO’s 
                                                 
 137. David Scheffer suggests that the Genocide Case “may well be the starting point for the 
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 144. Reisman, supra note 90, at 80 (citing Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Interven-
tion: The Case for Incremental Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND 
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involvement.145  Only Belgium appeared to rely primarily on humanitar-
ian grounds to justify its use of force.146 
Two trends are evident from these examples.  First, States that were 
reluctant to rely on humanitarian grounds for intervention may be more 
inclined today to rely on expanding authority, including the ICJ’s Geno-
cide Case and the responsibility-to-protect doctrine.  Second, although 
the U.N. has generally condemned any deviation from the prohibition of 
non-intervention, even in light of strong evidence of human rights 
abuses,147 it is highly unlikely that the U.N. will refer a case of humani-
tarian intervention to the ICC as criminal aggression under article 8 bis 
of the Rome Statute.  It is even more doubtful that the prosecutor will 
initiate an investigation or prosecution into uses of force that appear to be 
humanitarian in nature. 
The reasons for this are clear: humanitarian intervention, while not 
expressly authorized, is consistent with the U.N. Charter principles of 
respecting and protecting human rights.  When a State uses military force 
to respond to severe human rights atrocities, it operates on a good faith 
basis that such actions are part of a growing body of customary interna-
tional law and that it has an affirmative obligation to stop atrocity crimes 
under the responsibility to protect.  In any event, even if humanitarian 
intervention will forever be recognized as “illegal but legitimate,”148 it 
would be difficult to argue that there is a reasonable basis to believe that 
humanitarian intervention “by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes 
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a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”149  The use of 
military force to prevent gross human-rights violations does not rise to 
the level of a manifest violation of the U.N. Charter, and therefore, it will 
not constitute criminal aggression.  This assumes, of course, that the hu-
manitarian concerns are not pretext for other unlawful uses of force.150  
The danger for pretext is even more pronounced in certain actions to 
combat terrorism discussed in detail in the next section. 
IV.  ACTIONS AGAINST TERRORISM 
After the attacks on September 11, 2001, robust national security 
strategies have given rise to questions concerning the legality of certain 
applications of force to combat terrorism.  This debate centers largely on 
self-defense measures.  This section discusses the re-emergence of pre-
emptive self-defense and whether actions taken under the so-called 
“Bush Doctrine” crossed the threshold from lawful self-defense into un-
lawful aggression.151  Also, because the draft definition of aggression 
imputes individual responsibility only to State acts, and States now face 
the threat of terrorism, the question arises of how target States are to re-
spond to aggressive acts committed by non-State armed groups like ter-
rorist organizations.  In other words, if self-defense is permitted only in 
reaction to aggression by States, do all uses of force in response to at-
tacks by non-state armed groups constitute aggression by the target 
State?  This Part addresses the scope of the right to self-defense, the law-
fulness of preemptive measures and attacks against non-state armed 
groups, and whether such actions are manifest violations of the U.N. 
Charter for the purposes of criminal aggression. 
A.  The Scope of Self-Defense 
The U.N. Charter expressly permits the use of force for self-defense 
purposes,152 unlike humanitarian intervention, which finds no enumer-
ated authorization.  In light of recent attempts to expand the limits of the 
                                                 
 149. INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed seventh session, Annex I, Report 
of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 11, Article 8 bis, ¶ 1, ICC-
ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 9–13, 2009). 
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right to self-defense, the question remains: when does defensive action 
go beyond that authorized by the Charter and customary international 
law and cross the threshold of aggressive force?  Applying the two-step 
analysis discussed in Part II.C above, one must first determine the law-
fulness of the act and then determine whether the act is of the character, 
gravity, and scale to constitute a manifest violation of the U.N. Charter. 
The right to self-defense is not absolute.  The U.N. Charter imposes 
limits on its application.  For example, when a State uses force according 
to Article 51, it must report to the Security Council.153  Moreover, it is 
widely understood that customary international law imposes limits on the 
“inherent” right listed in the U.N. Charter.  Specifically, self-defense 
measures must be necessary and proportional to the initial attack.154 
The lawfulness of self-defense is a matter of context and degree.  
Two competing views have emerged regarding the appropriate circum-
stances for coercive self-defense measures.  For some, self-defense is a 
limited exception to a broad prohibition on the use of force.155  For oth-
ers, self-defense is an inherent right of every State and is integral to a 
successful national security strategy.156  Critics of the latter, permissive 
approach are quick to point out instances where the self-defense justifica-
tion for using force has been abused, particularly by great powers.157 
In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice set some 
parameters for the types of actions that warrant defensive measures.158  
The most precise standard set out in the Nicaragua case was that the 
“armed attack” must be of sufficient “scale and effect” to trigger the right 
to self-defense.159  In that case, supplying arms and providing logistical 
support to an armed group was not sufficient to constitute an armed at-
tack, while in contrast, sending an armed group to attack within the terri-
tory of another State was sufficient.160 
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The use of force in response to isolated or sporadic attacks is con-
sistently discouraged by commentators and the international commu-
nity.161  Two examples are worth noting.  First, on April 14, 1986, the 
United States bombed five Libyan military targets as a response to 
Libya’s involvement in the bombing of two airports in Rome and Vienna 
in 1985, as well as the bombing of a West Berlin nightclub in 1986, acts 
that targeted U.S. nationals.162  The U.S. response was widely con-
demned as a reprisal action and was not justified under Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter.163  Second, under a similar “accumulation of effects” justi-
fication, Israel bombed a Palestinian Liberation Organization target in 
Tunisia in October 1985, also to the condemnation of the international 
community.164  According to critics of this action, repeated terrorist at-
tacks against Israel did not constitute a legal justification for the use of 
force for self-defense purposes.165 
Self-defense exercised in reaction to an armed attack, whether it is 
an attack on nationals abroad or a direct attack on a State’s territory, 
must be judged in terms of lawful exceptions to the prohibition of the use 
of force under Article 2(4).  Preemptive actions taken without an under-
lying attack raise more significant issues.  This is particularly true when 
such acts are analyzed for the purpose of attaching criminal responsibil-
ity to aggression. 
B.  Preemptive Self-Defense 
The right to self-defense is not unlimited, and preemptive actions 
taken prior to an armed attack are subject to even more restrictions.  The 
discussion in recent years has focused on the U.S. National Security 
Strategy of 2002 and its broader implications for the use of anticipatory, 
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or preemptive, self-defense.166  At issue is whether a state may respond 
with coercive force to acts that fall short of an “armed attack.”  While 
this term is undefined, many consider Article 2(4) to be the starting 
point—an “armed attack” must be against the territorial integrity or po-
litical independence of a State.167  While certain preemptive actions will 
violate the U.N. Charter, it is another matter altogether whether such un-
lawful uses of force constitute a manifest violation for the purposes of 
criminal aggression. 
There is authority that suggests there must be at least preparatory 
acts, coupled with a clear intent to attack, in order to engage in preemp-
tive action prior to an “armed attack.”168  The Caroline case of 1837 es-
tablishes the authoritative standard for anticipatory defense.169  During 
the Canadian rebellion of 1837, British forces boarded an American ves-
sel—The Caroline—believed to be supporting rebel troops.  The British 
then set it on fire and sent it over Niagara Falls.170  U.S. Secretary of 
State Daniel Webster said Britain’s attack did not constitute self-
defense.171  As a result, the standard set by Secretary Webster and agreed 
to by the British was that for anticipatory attacks to be lawful, the under-
lying attack must be “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of 
means, and no moment for deliberation.”172  Ultimately, under the Caro-
line test, the threat must be real and imminent in order for the use of 
force to be justified as anticipatory self-defense.  This standard has been 
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cited by the Nuremburg Tribunal173 and the ICJ in the Nicaragua case 
and is considered by many to be customary international law.174 
Since the development of the Caroline doctrine, the customary 
norm of preemptive self-defense has been significantly reduced by Arti-
cle 51 of the U.N. Charter.175  Proponents of a strict adherence to Article 
51 argue that self-defense measures are unlawful unless an armed attack 
“occurs.”176  They argue that a mere threat is insufficient to permit coer-
cive self-defense measures.177  As evidence, proponents cite the absence 
of the term “threat” in Article 51, contrasted with the inclusion of the 
term “threat” in Articles 2(4) and 39.178  Furthermore, proponents of 
strict adherence to Article 51 frequently cite the risk in allowing preemp-
tive strikes based on a State’s own risk assessment.  This expanded the-
ory of self-defense, it is argued, would erode the U.N. Charter’s general 
prohibition of the use of force.179 
The use of preemptive self-defense, however, is not prohibited in 
every circumstance.  Those who would not wait to be attacked first argue 
that it is unreasonable to require a State to be decimated prior to defend-
ing itself.180  As recognized by one commentator, “no law . . . should be 
interpreted to compel the reductio ad absurdum that states invariably 
must await a first, perhaps decisive, military strike before using force to 
protect themselves.”181  Would Austria have acted unlawfully if it had 
preemptively attacked German forces prior to the Anschluss in 1938?  
After all, the Nuremburg Tribunal decided that Nazi leaders were guilty 
of aggression vis-à-vis Austria even though there was no armed attack 
against Austria.182  Although the annexation occurred “without the use of 
armed force[,] internal subversive actions and the immediate threat of 
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extreme violence assured in these cases the ‘peaceful co-operation’ of the 
governments concerned.”183  Surely if criminal aggression existed under 
those circumstances, preemptive self-defense measures would have been 
warranted. 
Examination of post-Charter uses of preemptive force further illus-
trates that this is a decidedly gray area of the law.184  Take, for example, 
Israel’s preemptive strike on Egypt that initiated the 1967 Six-Day 
War.185  Israel’s attack was based on threats made by President Nassar 
and his closure of the Straits of Tiran.186  The attack received general 
support as a valid use of anticipatory defense.  However, the reaction to 
Israel’s preemptive strike against Iraq’s nuclear reactor in Isirik in 1981 
was not as favorable.187  The Security Council, with U.S. support, con-
demned that action, stating that in the absence of an attack from Iraq, 
Israel did not need to destroy the reactor.188 
Even the U.S. bombardment of Libya in 1985 had an element of 
preemptive self-defense.  In addition to the defense of U.S. personnel 
abroad, the actions against Libyan military targets were supposed to be 
“designed to disrupt Libya’s ability to carry out terrorist acts and to deter 
future terrorist acts by Libya.”189  More recently, the U.S. responded to 
the East African embassy bombings in 1998 by targeting suspected al 
Qaeda strongholds in Sudan and Afghanistan.  This, too, served a dual 
purpose of self-defense under Article 51 and preventing “the imminent 
threat of further terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities.”190 
The U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002 had the potential to be 
a game changer, had it not been so recklessly applied.191  This policy al-
lowed for a much more permissive application of preemptive force.  In 
March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq in furtherance of this strat-
egy.  The U.S.-led coalition acted initially on the basis of preemptive 
defense, arguing that Saddam Hussein’s desire to possess weapons of 
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mass destruction was an immediate threat particularly in the post-9/11 
“war on terror” climate.192  The non-existence of weapons of mass de-
struction, however, proved the need to stay defensive measures until the 
threat is imminent and real—as required under Caroline.  Many consider 
the U.S. occupation of Iraq to be one of many examples of the misuse of 
anticipatory defense by a great power.193 
There is little consensus on the scope of the legality of preemptive 
self-defense.  Oppenheim’s International Law states that “while anticipa-
tory action in self-defence is normally unlawful, it is not necessarily un-
lawful in all circumstances.”194  Therefore, whether an unlawful act of 
preemptive self-defense is a manifest violation of the U.N. Charter must 
be determined on a case-by-case basis.  Israel’s action against Egypt 
would not likely have formed a reasonable basis to believe that aggres-
sion was committed due to Israel’s legitimate anticipation of an attack 
aimed at its very existence.  On the other hand, the ICC would likely find 
the U.S. invasion of Iraq to be unlawful.195  The U.S. justification for 
applying defensive measures appears so far removed from the Caroline 
standard, not to mention from the heightened requirement under Article 
51 (that an armed attack actually occur), that it is difficult to reconcile 
the overt violation of Article 2(4).  Therefore, in practice, even though 
preemptive defense is lawful in some circumstances, it is likely to come 
within the purview of the ICC’s investigative responsibilities into ag-
gression more frequently than humanitarian-based intervention. 
C.  Non-State Armed Groups: Uncertain Adversaries 
International law regulating the use of force, including self-defense, 
was developed on the assumption that States, or armed groups acting on 
behalf of States, are the parties to armed conflict.  The draft definition of 
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aggression reflects this standard.196  Only States can commit acts of ag-
gression, whether carried out by the State itself or by an armed group 
controlled by the State. 
Historically there have been at least three distinct types of conflict 
involving non-State actors.  First, States engage in proxy-wars where two 
States employ non-State groups to fight on their behalf on a third State’s 
territory.197  This was so during the Spanish Civil War when General 
Franco led Germany’s fascist allies against the Soviet-backed Republi-
cans in Spain.198  Second, States’ use of non-State armed groups to 
launch external attacks against another State’s territory.  In 1977, the Se-
curity Council condemned the “aggression” of mercenaries who attacked 
the territory of Benin without naming the State that backed them.199  Fi-
nally, some non-State actors operate independent of significant State 
backing.  Such is the case with the Maoist rebels in Nepal.200  And, even 
though the Taliban permitted al Qaeda to use Afghanistan as a launching 
point for attacks, it did not exercise effective control as is otherwise seen 
with States and armed groups. 
Each type of conflict involving non-state actors raises significant 
legal issues under the jus ad bellum.  These issues become more complex 
when analyzed in the context of potential responsibility for unlawful ag-
gression.  For example, what level of control must a State exercise over 
an armed group in order to be held responsible for that group’s armed 
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attacks?  Moreover, if a non-State actor initiates an attack against a State, 
and it does so with no significant outside support, does the target State 
commit aggression when it responds with coercive force? 
1.  State Control Requirements 
States’ use of non-State armed groups to commit aggressive acts 
was a concern to the international community even before the inception 
of the United Nations.  At the San Francisco Conference, China proposed 
that the U.N. Charter include the following element to the definition of 
aggression: “Provision of support to armed groups, formed within [a 
State’s] territory, which have invaded the territory of another state; or 
refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded state, to take in its 
own territory all the measures in its power to deprive such groups of all 
assistance or protection.”201  This proposal, although not adopted in the 
U.N. Charter, proved to have merit as the use of non-State groups in-
creased during the U.S.-Soviet proxy conflicts of the Cold War era.202 
In 1974, the General Assembly defined aggression in terms of 
States’ support of armed groups.  Article 3 of GA Resolution 3314—
adopted in the current definition of aggression—explains that States 
commit aggression by “[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed 
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed 
force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed 
above, or its substantial involvement therein.”203 
The ICJ addressed this issue in the Nicaragua case, holding that a 
State must exercise “effective control” over a non-State armed group in 
order for its actions to be attributable to the State.204  Similarly, the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) attributed 
the acts of the Bosnian-Serb army to Serbia due to Serbia’s “overall con-
trol” over its Bosnian forces.205  Both the ICTY206 and ICJ207 have re-
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quired something more than mere logistical support for a State to be re-
sponsible for the acts of the attacking armed group.208 
Beyond the control theory of responsibility, a State may also be 
held accountable for the conduct of non-State actors when the State 
openly acknowledges its participation in this conduct.209  The Interna-
tional Law Commission recognizes the “control” and “acknowledgment” 
basis for State responsibly as customary international law.210  
2.  Targeting Non-State Actors 
The issue before the ICC will be whether a State commits aggres-
sion when it responds to attacks by non-State actors with armed force on 
the territory of another State.  As previously discussed, self-defense or 
collective self-defense under the U.N. Charter paradigm is limited in 
scope.211  The prevalent view is that prior to exercising self-defense, a 
State must be the victim of either aggression or an imminent attack.  It 
seems anachronistic, however, to require a State contemplating defensive 
measures against a terrorist organization to first determine whether an-
other State exerts “effective control” over the armed group.  For exam-
ple, Israel’s response to consistent rocket attacks by the Lebanon-based 
Hezbollah organization was justified on the principle of self-defense 
even though Lebanon certainly does not have effective control over Hez-
bollah.212  Nonetheless, the legality of such actions has been called into 
question under a formalistic approach to the use of force when dealing 
with non-State actors.213 
The ICJ Wall Opinion, an advisory opinion to the General Assem-
bly on the legality of Israel’s construction of a security barrier on occu-
pied Palestinian Territory, is the touchstone for the critics of States tar-
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geting non-State actors on another State’s territory.  The ICJ reaffirmed 
the position that the right to self-defense arises only when an attack by or 
on behalf of a State occurs.214  The ICJ stated that “Article 51 of the 
Charter . . . recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence 
in the case of armed attack by one State against another State.  However, 
Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign 
State.”215  Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell elaborates on the ICJ’s opin-
ion, stating that “the right to use armed force is connected with terri-
tory—facts of fighting on the ground, not the presence of an individual 
suspected of being a terrorist.  Since Israel is in control of the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, it cannot claim self-defense—that would be self-
defense against itself.”216 
The United States’ use of force in Afghanistan in response to the 
terrorist attacks of 2001 has also been criticized on the basis of failing to 
adhere to the State responsibility paradigm.217  The United States based 
its actions on self-defense principles, even though the Taliban regime did 
not maintain “effective control” over al Qaeda, the armed group respon-
sible for the attacks.218  On this point Helen Duffy writes, “The use of 
force against terrorists in a state’s territory absent responsibility for their 
action raises questions as to the respect for the territorial integrity and 
political independence of the state, reflected in Article 2(4).”219  Duffy 
suggests that the intervention in Afghanistan does not represent an out-
right dismissal of the State responsibility paradigm, but rather, a lower-
ing of the threshold required for an armed attack.220 
There is no question that the United States attempted to readjust the 
formalistic interpretation of the right to self-defense against attacks by 
non-State actors post 9/11.  President George W. Bush stated, “We will 
make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and 
those who harbor them.”221  This decision was clearly based on an as-
serted right to self-defense because of “the decision of the Taliban re-
gime to allow the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by [al 
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Qaeda] as a base of operation.”222  Therefore, the United States attempted 
to expand the notion of justifiable self-defense by requiring little more 
than that a State “harbor” non-State armed groups that attack U.S. inter-
ests.  This appears to be at odds with the “direct control” and other re-
quirements espoused by the ICJ in the Nicaragua decision,223 the ICTY 
in the Tadic appeal, 224 and the ILC’s adoption of State responsibility 
principles.225  Furthermore, the draft definition of aggression does not 
presently allow exceptions for attacks by non-State actors. 
On the other hand, the U.N.’s endorsement of self-defense meas-
ures against terrorist attacks tends to place this form of self-defense out-
side the aggressive acts prohibited by Article 8 bis.  The Security Coun-
cil specifically endorsed U.S. actions in response to 9/11.226  In Resolu-
tion 1368, the Security Council stated that the attack against the United 
States on September 11, 2001, was “a threat to international peace and 
security.”227  This permitted the United States and others to take meas-
ures “to maintain or restore international peace and security” according 
to Articles 41 and 42 of the U.N. Charter.228 
Resolution 1368 provides strong support for the principle that Arti-
cle 51 self-defense measures can be triggered by armed attacks by terror-
ist groups.229  This calls into question whether the State responsibility 
requirement is still necessary to use force in self-defense against attacks 
by non-State armed groups.230  Professor Amos Guiora notes that 
[t]raditional or conventional international law based on the assump-
tion that war is an armed conflict between two States is obviously 
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inapplicable to what has been deemed a new form of armed conflict.  
This new form of armed conflict involves States and non-State ac-
tors, sometimes supported by States but not necessarily so.  It would 
be illogical to expect the victim State not to respond.231 
The draft definition of aggression must be read in the context of 
modern conflict.  Drawing upon previous interpretations of the U.N. 
Charter, the current draft—although not providing a specific exception—
recognizes “that uses of force transcend the paradigmatic cross-border 
attack by armies to encompass the possibility of equally devastating raids 
by [non-State] actors.”232 
Assuming for the moment that targeting non-State actors remains a 
U.N. Charter violation, these actions will not likely reach the level of 
criminal aggression.  That these actions are arguably lawful, noting the 
Security Council’s subsequent endorsement of U.S. actions following 
9/11, seems to preclude discussion in terms of a “manifest” violation of 
the U.N. Charter. 
Furthermore, even in circumstances where the lawfulness of a cer-
tain action against non-State actors is in doubt, the intent to violate the 
territorial integrity or political independence of a State is absent.  For 
example, when the U.S. targets al Qaeda and Taliban elements in Paki-
stan, it is not a manifest violation of the U.N. Charter, even though it is a 
clear breach of Pakistan’s territorial integrity.233  The purpose of these 
bombardments is not to invade Pakistan or overthrow its government; 
rather, it is to eliminate a specific threat to the United States and its allies 
in the region. 
The legality and potential criminalization of actions against terror-
ism will be judged on the proportionality and necessity of such actions.  
On proportionality, Guiora notes, “Targeted killing can only be imple-
mented against those terrorists who either directly or indirectly partici-
pate in terrorism in a fashion that is equivalent to involvement in armed 
conflict.”234  Similarly, under a necessity analysis, if a State engages in 
regime change or the acquisition of territory under the auspices of self-
defense against non-State actors, significant questions will arise as to the 
lawfulness of the action, resulting in a much better case for prosecution 
of criminal aggression.  For instance, the invasion of Afghanistan and the 
overthrow of the Taliban regime were necessary to eliminate the com-
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bined threat of the Taliban and al Qaeda.  Conversely, the invasion of 
Iraq—based on the information we now know regarding weapons of 
mass destruction—was not necessary for any cognizable self-defense 
justification.  The final draft of the crime of aggression may determine to 
what extent these actions should be excluded from the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
V.  ACCOMMODATING POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS 
The threshold question of the definition of aggression will answer 
which applications of the use of force will be subject to the ICC’s juris-
diction.  The Assembly of States Parties must necessarily consider the 
limits that criminalized aggression will set on the future use of force.  
The potential deterrent effect that the operational crime will have cannot 
be understated.  As such, this section seeks to identify the merits or risks 
underlying humanitarian intervention and actions to combat terrorism 
and the exceptions available to the drafters of Article 8 bis to prevent 
these actions from being investigated and prosecuted. 
A.  The Double Edge of Deterrence 
The adoption of the crime of aggression is intended to deter unlaw-
ful armed conflict.  But is the hope of deterrence a double-edged sword?  
On one hand, the criminalization of the use of force may serve to deter 
adventurous military expeditions, but on the other hand, it may also give 
pause to States wishing to engage in humanitarian pursuits.  If the start-
ing point for the use of force is a general prohibition, followed by the 
permissible use of force under Security Council authorization or self-
defense, then we must look at the rationale behind potential “exceptions” 
to unlawful force. 
Humanitarian intervention is an example of an application of force 
that the Assembly of States Parties may not wish to prevent.  Histori-
cally, the international community has been unsuccessful at preventing 
mass atrocities.  This raises the following question: “[I]f life is the most 
precious of things . . . should not acting to prevent before the fact, as op-
posed to acting to punish after the fact, be the primary technique of inter-
national law for dealing with mass murder?”235 
The ICC, as an institution that seeks to hold individuals accountable 
for “the most serious crimes of international concern”236 and seeks to 
“contribute to the prevention of such crimes,”237 must not discourage the 
most useful tool to combat widespread human rights violations.  Dr. Tay-
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lor Seybolt conducted a study of humanitarian intervention and found 
that unilateral or collective humanitarian interventions had a much great-
er success rate in saving lives than did U.N.-led missions.238  The possi-
ble chilling effect of humanitarian intervention based on the criminaliza-
tion of aggression would be regrettable.239 
The United States has particular concerns about the role of its 
forces in multilateral peacekeeping operations, including humanitarian 
intervention.  David Scheffer, the former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for 
War Crimes Issues, framed U.S. concerns as follows: 
Multinational peacekeeping forces operating in a country that has 
joined the [Rome Statute] can be exposed to the [ICC’s] jurisdiction 
even if the country of the individual peacekeeper has not joined the 
treaty . . . [this] could inhibit the ability of the United States to use 
its military to meet alliance obligations and participate in multina-
tional operations, including humanitarian interventions to save civil-
ian lives.240 
These concerns are not as widely shared when it comes to actions to 
combat terrorism.241  The general disfavor of preemptive self-defense is 
acute since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.242  The distinction between 
preemption and humanitarian intervention is self-evident.  The need for 
intervention on a humanitarian basis will, in most circumstances, be de-
monstrable prior to the application of force.  Either a massive violation 
of human rights is underway or it is not.  On the other hand, intervention 
prior to an actual armed attack based on subjective threats to national 
security will always be prone to error and abuse.243  That the crime of 
aggression will have a deterrent effect on preemptive actions vis-à-vis 
States may be a welcome enforcement mechanism. 
Targeting non-State actors, however, will remain a challenge, both 
doctrinally and legally.  Amos Guiora states: 
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From experience gained over the years, it has become clear that the 
State must be able to act preemptively in order to either deter terror-
ists or, at the very least, prevent the terrorist act from taking place.  
By now, we have learned the price society pays if it is unable to 
prevent terrorist acts.  The question that must be answered—both 
from a legal and policy perspective—is what tools should be given 
to the State to combat terrorism?244 
Assuming the objective is to allow States to defend against terrorist 
attacks, the crime of aggression should be drafted in such a way that 
would not limit a State’s pursuit of lawful security measures.  How to 
reconcile humanitarian concerns and national security priorities with in-
dividual responsibility for criminal aggression is the focus of the next 
section. 
B.  Exceptions, Procedure, and Mens Rea 
The draft definition of aggression contains no exceptions to the 
prohibition of the use of force; further, there are no exceptions for ac-
tions justified on humanitarian or national security grounds.245  At least 
one school of thought maintains that there should be no exceptions to the 
acts of aggression provided for in Article 8 bis, paragraph 2. 246  This ap-
proach, first put forth by the Russians during the drafting of GA Resolu-
tion 3314 in 1973, 247 considers the “first use of armed force . . . in con-
travention of the Charter” to constitute prima facie evidence of an act of 
aggression.248  Under this approach, however, the Security Council may 
conclude that a determination of aggression “would not be justified in the 
light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts con-
cerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.”249 
Another approach is to include exceptions directly in the definition 
of aggression.  Professor David Scheffer suggests a new Article 8 bis: 
For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a posi-
tion effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or 
military action (in whole or substantial part) of a State, of an unlaw-
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ful military intervention by one State into the territory (land, sea, or 
air) of another State of such character, gravity and scale that it con-
stitutes a manifest violation of the prohibition on the use of force 
under article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, provided that the 
lawful deployment or use of armed force undertaken pursuant to 
Security Council authorization, United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 377(V) of 3 November 1950, or Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter shall be excluded from such definition. 
The elements of the crime of aggression shall draw, inter alia, from 
Articles 2 and 3 of United Nations General Assembly resolution 
3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 to establish the character of an 
act of aggression for purposes of criminal responsibility under this 
Statute.250 
This approach specifically incorporates lawful uses of force as excep-
tions to criminal aggression.  These exceptions include actions author-
ized by the Security Council, the Uniting for Peace option,251 and indi-
vidual or collective self-defense measures.  Moreover, Paragraph 2 al-
lows the ICC to consider acts that are not specifically listed in GA Reso-
lution 3314, but that have the character of aggression.  This is consistent 
with the practice of the Security Council and the ICJ, which have never 
considered themselves bound by GA Resolution 3314.252  While these 
changes to the draft definition do not explicitly preclude jurisdiction over 
actions such as humanitarian intervention, the ICC and prosecutor have 
room to argue that certain actions fall within an exception in the statute. 
The Security Council’s role in determining acts of aggression must 
be considered when discussing possible exceptions to the prohibition of 
the use of force.  The Security Council’s role typically factors into the 
issue of the trigger mechanism for the ICC’s jurisdiction, but determin-
ing the lawfulness of a given act could also shape the threshold analysis.  
For example, some feel that as long as the Security Council is given ex-
clusive authority to make determinations on aggression, there is no need 
to include exceptions within the definition.253  In cases of questionable 
lawfulness, the Security Council could adopt a subsequent resolution 
supporting a particular use of force.254  Under this approach, the ICC 
would not be able to exercise jurisdiction. 
However, including a specific provision that creates an exception 
for humanitarian intervention or actions to combat terrorism would be 
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unwise.  This makes sense in light of the purpose of criminalizing ag-
gression, and the purpose of the ICC generally, to prosecute “the most 
serious crimes of international concern.”255  Eventually, exceptions could 
swallow the prohibitive rules.  Nonetheless, the procedural framework 
established in the Rome Statute provides for ample room to eliminate 
outlying cases of alleged aggression. 
Article 31 of the Rome Statute provides specific grounds for ex-
cluding criminal responsibility.256  Self-defense is among these grounds, 
and while it refers to an individual’s use of self-defense, not typically 
associated with the initiation of an armed conflict, there is no reason why 
an individual accused of committing aggression under Article 8 bis could 
not avail himself of the protections of Article 31.257  Moreover, para-
graph 3 of Article 31 allows broader considerations to be taken into ac-
count for the purposes of excluding criminal liability.  The considera-
tions include international treaty obligations, customary international 
law, and other general principles of law,258 and may incorporate princi-
ples such as the responsibility to protect,259 or “active self-defense” to 
target non-State actors.260 
The ICC’s pre-trial considerations will play a significant role in de-
termining whether certain actions fall within the threshold of criminal 
aggression.  The ICC weighs several factors when making a determina-
tion of admissibility.  Among the most important is the gravity of the 
alleged offense.  Article 17(1)(d) provides that a case is inadmissible 
where “[t]he case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by 
the [ICC].”261  This is particularly relevant to the issue of “manifest vio-
lations” of the U.N. Charter because aggression occurs only in cases of 
sufficient “character, gravity, and scale.”262  Where lawfulness is ques-
tionable, instances of humanitarian intervention or actions to combat ter-
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rorism will not likely move beyond the pre-trial chamber when they le-
gitimately seek only to prevent atrocity crimes or target non-State actors 
posing a threat to the attacking State.  If these actions are carried out with 
due regard for proportionality and necessity requirements, they should 
fail the ICC’s admissibility requirements.  Borderline cases that move 
forward nonetheless may still be challenged by the ICC, an accused, a 
State that could exercise jurisdiction, or a State from which acceptance of 
jurisdiction is required for the ICC to proceed.263  The pre-trial proce-
dures provide ample opportunity for challenges to the exercise of juris-
diction over alleged acts of aggression. 
Assuming a borderline case is referred to the ICC, the prosecutor 
must consider all of the elements of the offense prior to initiating an in-
vestigation or prosecution, including the mens rea element.264  Under the 
intent theory, only a mens rea analysis could determine whether the use 
of force was legitimate. 
The importance of mens rea in determining whether certain actions 
cross the threshold of aggression cannot be understated.  First introduced 
in a 1969 proposed definition of aggression, intent was a pivotal element 
to the offense.265  The issue was later raised by the German delegation to 
the Preparatory Committee.266  Ultimately, the intent requirement was 
not included in previous draft definitions because the drafters felt that the 
Security Council could weigh the actors’ intent, and accurately defining 
the object of intent proved difficult.267 
More recently, the Preparatory Commission used an “intentionally 
and knowingly” standard.268  Similarly, a previous paper considered by 
the Special Working Group specified the requisite mental state in the 
“Elements of the crime of aggression” section.269  According to that 
working paper, the perpetrator must have “intent and knowledge” that 
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the act was a flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter.270  This mirrors the 
mental element of the other offenses within the jurisdiction of the ICC.271 
When the “intent and knowledge” standard is applied to humanitar-
ian intervention and certain actions to target terrorists, there is little doubt 
that truly borderline cases—those not intending to overthrow a govern-
ment or seize territory—will be removed from consideration.  The prose-
cutor will have a difficult time justifying that there is a reasonable basis 
to initiate an investigation into actions similar to the NATO bombing of 
Kosovo, which was intended to protect the slaughter of Kosovo Albani-
ans.  Similarly, U.S. leaders will not be prosecuted for actions taken in 
self-defense, such as U.S. drone strikes on Taliban remnants in Pakistan 
simply because they do not have the mental state required for a manifest 
violation of the U.N. Charter.  The ICC may, however, question actions 
similar to the 2003 invasion of Iraq because the intent was, at least in 
part, to overthrow a government and occupy the country for at least some 
time.  Therefore, the mental state of alleged perpetrators of aggression 
will be the best indication of whether a specific act crosses the threshold 
of aggression. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The ICC will have a fine line to walk when addressing alleged acts 
of aggression.  The ICC must balance its obligations: on the one hand, it 
must prosecute criminal aggression, and on the other, it must not intrude 
on a State’s right to self-defense in combatting terror or deter interven-
tions necessary to combat egregious human-rights violations.  The thre-
shold clause in the definition of aggression, requiring that State acts be 
manifest violations, will assist in precluding fringe cases from the ICC’s 
jurisdiction. 
There are many who would add no limits to jurisdiction over acts of 
aggression.  Critics of the threshold clause would criminalize all uses of 
force; however, this proposition is not only unrealistic, but contrary to 
the U.N. Charter and customary law.  Nonetheless, Article 8 bis will, no 
doubt, reign in “adventurous” military expeditions in the future, giving 
pause to decision-makers prior to using force. 
Of the uses of force examined in this article, the most contentious 
and unresolved remains the role of non-State actors in the jus ad bellum 
framework.  Non-State actors are now arguably the greatest threat to in-
ternational peace and security.  Once the definition of aggression is 
adopted into the Rome Statute, and the ICC and prosecutor have the op-
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portunity to initiate cases, one can only hope that the jurisprudence that 
follows will add clarity and legal guidance to regime elites and serve as a 
deterrent to potential aggressors. 
 
